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  Multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) are currently being examined as a way to bring compatible professions together
as a single practice.  MDPs present the premier ethical and economic issues facing the legal profession and its
future. [FN1]  An MDP is defined as "a partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that
includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one . . . of its purposes the delivery of legal services to [clients] . . . ."
[FN2]  MDPs hold themselves out to the public as providing nonlegal as well as legal services. [FN3]  The idea
behind an MDP is to provide clients with convenient "one-stop shopping" for legal, financial, consulting, and
insurance services. [FN4]  According to one commentator, the controversy surrounding law firm diversification will
define the practice of law in the United States for the next century. [FN5]
  MDPs started becoming a major issue for the legal profession in the early 1990s as the Big Five accounting firms
increased the number of lawyers that they recruited and hired. [FN6]  In Europe and Asia, major accounting firms
began moving into the legal *284 services market by establishing, acquiring, and creating relationships with law
firms. [FN7]  In the United States, however, more strict legal ethics rules drafted by the American Bar Association
(ABA), [FN8] and implemented by most state bar associations, [FN9] historically have operated to prohibit lawyers
and nonlawyers from partnering to provide professional services or sharing fees. [FN10]  An *285 increasingly
global economy makes the need for re-evaluation of those policies inevitable.
  In 1998, the ABA created a Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice  (Commission) that unanimously
recommended changing the rules to allow lawyers to enter into partnerships with other professionals. [FN11]  Under
the Commission's proposal, lawyers could share fees with nonlawyer professionals on the condition that the lawyers
continue to follow all ethical obligations imposed on lawyers generally.  The courts would still regulate the practices
and apply traditional legal ethics standards to the practices. [FN12]
  This Comment will discuss the emergence of MDPs overseas, the positions taken in support of and against MDPs
being allowed in the United States, and the ABA's current stance on the topic.  The Comment concludes by
analyzing the likelihood that MDPs will be able to engage in the practice of law in the United States in the future
and the impact that such practices might have on the legal profession.
I The Emergence of MDPs
  In the early 1990s, several European countries eased rules that had kept the legal and accounting professions
independent. [FN13]  As these rules relaxed, accounting firms rapidly hired more lawyers and affiliated with or
bought law firms.  Corporate clients were interested in obtaining tax and legal advice from a unified professional
services team. [FN14]
  In countries that prohibit MDPs, accounting firms have been successful in developing legal practices by entering
into cooperation agreements and alliances with law firms to circumvent any restrictions. [FN15]  In some countries,
accounting firms dominate the *286 legal practice, [FN16] while in other countries accounting firms must focus
their legal work in the tax area because local bar associations place insurmountable restrictions on the practice of
law by accounting firms and other organizations owned by non- lawyers. [FN17]
  Already, the Big Five are informally considered the world's largest law firms.  Ernst & Young employs 3,300 tax
lawyers worldwide and 850 lawyers in the United States. [FN18]  PricewaterhouseCoopers maintains over 3,000
lawyers around the world. [FN19]  Globally, these new law practices have not only taken lawyers away from law
firms, they have taken a considerable amount of work from law firms as well. [FN20]  Although the competition
from accounting firms is relatively new for most U.S.-based law firms, [FN21] the intensity of the competition will
likely increase in the future as accounting firms' law departments increasingly compete for lucrative legal work.
[FN22]
II Evolution of Nonlawyer Privileges
A. Early Development
  Two cases provide the contextual background in which to analyze the current reforms because they demonstrate
the need other professionals have for a work- product privilege.  In Couch v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled
that federal law does *287 not recognize an accountant-client privilege. [FN23]  In Couch, a taxpayer hired an
independent accountant to whom she regularly delivered various business and tax records that remained in the
accountant's continuous possession.  The Court ruled that the taxpayer's divestment of possession of such records
disqualified the client from being able to invoke the Fifth Amendment. [FN24]  The taxpayer was not entitled to
invoke the Fifth Amendment to prevent the production of her business and tax records that were in possession of the
accountant pursuant to a subpoena served on the accountant in connection with investigation of tax liability. [FN25]
  A decade later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Couch in United States v. Arthur Young & Co. [FN26]  In Arthur
Young, the Court held that creation of an accountant work-product privilege would be misplaced and conflict with
Congress' clear intent. [FN27]  The Court stated that work-product immunity for an accountant's tax accrual
workpapers was not an analogue to the lawyer work-product doctrine.  An independent certified public accountant
performs a different role from an attorney whose duty, as his client's confidential adviser and advocate, is to present
the client's case in the most favorable light. [FN28]  In certifying the public reports that depict a corporation's
financial status, the accountant performs a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the
client, and owes allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. [FN29]
  The accounting profession's desire to have an accountant- confidentiality privilege increased as the Internal
Revenue Service *288 (IRS) audit policies have evolved.  The IRS's policy, as described in the Internal Revenue
Manual (IRM), is to seek tax accrual workpapers only in unusual circumstances. [FN30]  However, in recent years,
the IRS has become more aggressive.  This new policy is demonstrated by the use of financial status or lifestyle
auditing, Information Document Requests, summonses, and subpoenas to seek tax accrual workpapers, internal tax
memos, tax opinions, tax engagement letters, billing statements, and other similar documents from taxpayers and
their accountants. [FN31]  This led the AICPA's Tax Executive Committee to recommend that the IRS amend the
IRM to include similar limits on seeking tax advice communicated between CPAs and their clients.  The IRS
National Office declined to expand the IRM workpaper policy. [FN32]
B. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998
  With the recent enactment of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Act), legislators
in the United States have taken a significant step toward allowing accounting firms to practice law. [FN33] The Act
provided legislation to restructure the IRS, including a provision to give accountants who offer tax advice the same
confidentiality privileges formerly available only to attorneys. [FN34]  The Act extended the privilege of
confidentiality for noncriminal federal tax matters, formerly available only for communications between attorneys
and clients, to CPAs and other federally authorized tax practitioners. [FN35]  The *289 Act also extended the
attorney-client privilege to certain communications between a client and an authorized tax practitioner, which
includes parties authorized to practice before the IRS. [FN36]  Such authorized parties include certified public
accountants, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries. [FN37]  This privilege of confidentiality can only be asserted in
noncriminal tax proceedings before the IRS and noncriminal tax proceedings in the federal courts brought by or
against the United States. [FN38]  The privilege does not apply to communications that would not be protected by
the attorney-client privilege. [FN39]  For example, information disclosed to an attorney for purposes of preparing a
tax return is not privileged. [FN40]  Similarly, the privilege is waived under the same rules that apply to the
attorney-client privilege. [FN41]
  While the new accountant-confidentiality privilege is similar to the attorney-client privilege in many respects, the
privilege does not provide accountants with the confidentiality privilege in advising corporate clients on tax shelters.
[FN42]  Corporate tax shelters have been broadly defined in recent legislation. [FN43]  Section 6662 defines a tax
shelter as any partnership, entity, investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement "a significant
purpose" of which is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax. [FN44]
  *290 The Conference Report on the Act indicates that legislators did not believe that the promotion of tax shelters
is part of the routine relationship between a tax practitioner and a client; accordingly, legislators did not anticipate
that the tax shelter limitation will adversely affect such routine relationships. [FN45]  This is strange language given
that an accountant's routine relationship with a corporate client will often result in offering the client advice on ways
to minimize the federal income tax consequences of a proposed transaction. [FN46]  Action of this nature can be
properly classified as avoidance under section 7525(b).  However, accountants argue that the language appears to
create a distinction between relationships with recurring and nonrecurring clients, such that the promotion of a
corporate tax shelter may not refer to the rendering of tax planning ideas to recurring clients. [FN47]  Resolving this
point will be crucial to the success of accounting firms' efforts to take an increasing amount of business from law
firms because accounting firms will be in a position to take care of all of a large corporate client's needs. [FN48]
III ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
  In the United States, the ABA's current Model Rules of Professional Conduct  (Model Rules), [FN49] which have
been adopted by most states in some form, [FN50] prevent nonlawyers from providing legal services, limit the
association of lawyers with nonlawyers, and control lawyers' nonlegal services. [FN51]  Every jurisdiction in the
United States, except the District of Columbia, has adopted the *291 position of the ABA regarding fee-splitting
with non-lawyers. [FN52]
  The Model Rules prohibit nonlawyers from holding an ownership interest in a legal practice. [FN53]  Model Rule
5.4 prohibits lawyers from sharing fees for legal services and forming partnerships to provide legal services with
nonlawyers. [FN54]  In addition, Model Rule 5.4 forbids lawyers from practicing law in an organization practicing
for profit if a nonlawyer owns an interest, is a corporate officer, or has the right to direct lawyers' professional
judgment. [FN55]
  Model Rule 5.4's comment states that the limitations set forth in the rule serve to protect lawyers' independent
professional judgment. [FN56] Similarly, the Model Code Ethical Considerations explain that lawyers should not
practice law with nonlawyers because lawyers should not assist or encourage nonlawyers to practice law. [FN57]
Essentially, the ABA prohibits nonlawyers from managing law firms because the ABA thinks that nonlawyer
managers would be tempted to interfere with the professional relationships of lawyers in order to make a profit.
[FN58]
IV Opposition to MDPs Remains Strong
  In the past, the ABA was adamantly opposed to accountant- confidentiality privileges because these privileges
signaled the *292 beginning of a new era in the legal services industry. [FN59]  Many legal experts see the creation
of accountant-confidentiality privileges as the first step for accounting firms to lawfully engage in the practice of
law.  In reality though, accounting firms have been forming partnerships with law firms overseas and engaging in
the practice of law for several years. [FN60]  As accounting firms are given more opportunities to engage in
activities typically reserved for law firms, accounting firms will continue to take clients away from law firms.
[FN61]  As a whole, lawyers do not appear well-organized to fight the accounting firms. [FN62]  Suprisingly few
lawyers seem concerned by the threat that accounting firms pose. [FN63]  The opinions of lawyers are varied and
widely held: some feel threatened by the MDP movement while others do not; some regard MDPs as an ethical
abomination, while others regard them as an economic inevitability. [FN64]  To be sure, accounting firms have
greater financial resources than law firms.  The largest accounting firms have billions of dollars in revenues, making
"even the largest law firms appear as specks in the marketplace . . . ." [FN65]  Further, no professional service
providers, except for lawyers, have voiced opposition to being able to split fees with lawyers.
  While MDPs may affect lawyer independence, zealous representation, and the maintenance of client confidences,
the main argument that lawyers advance against accounting firms engaging in law practice is that accounting firms
will be unable to resolve conflicts of interest among their clients. [FN66] Lawyers argue that the huge size of the
major accounting firms would create major conflicts of interest if MDPs were allowed in the United States. [FN67]
That issue, however, does not create an insurmountable obstacle. *293 While unheard of in law firms, accounting
firms often represent both parties to a corporate merger or acquisition. [FN68]  Clients generally consent to such
representation, and an accounting firm can handle each side's interests and preserve confidentiality by keeping
employees on each side of the deal separate from each other. [FN69]  For lawyers, it is nearly impossible to
represent clients with adverse interests due to current professional rules of conduct. [FN70]
  Further, lawyers are sensitive about MDPs with accountants because of the fundamental and inherently conflicting
differences between the professions. [FN71]  Accountants have duties to be objective and to publicly disclose
corporate information, while lawyers are obligated to act as zealous advocates and strictly maintain client
confidentiality. [FN72]  In order to succeed in the MDP arena, lawyers and accountants will have to cooperate and
be willing to accept changes in their traditional roles.
V MDPs Provide Lawyers and Clients with Opportunity
  Supporters of MDPs portray them as ending a restrictive practice and offering more consumer choice.  They argue
that lawyers' objections are motivated by self-preservation as much as by *294 ethical scruples. [FN73]  They are
concerned that rules limiting access to the U.S. legal market result in higher prices and fewer services to the legal
services consumer. [FN74]  Government regulation of legal services typically results in a cartel in the legal services
market. [FN75]  The creation of cartels acts to increase the prices that consumers pay and reduce the services
consumers receive when compared to prices and services in more competitive markets. [FN76]  Stephen Gillers, a
legal scholar, argues that Model Rule 5.4's prohibition of MDPs harms consumers of legal services by suppressing
competition in the supply of legal services and increasing prices for legal services. [FN77]  In addition, many
supporters of MDPs believe "the legal services market would benefit from the increased competition and investment
that would result from allowing banks, retailers, and insurance companies to expand into legal services." [FN78]
  A persuasive argument in favor of MDPs is that allowing accounting firms to practice law is in the public interest.
Full disclosure to an accountant enables a client to conform their conduct to the law and present claims or defenses
when litigation arises. [FN79]  Courts "commonly have permitted nonlawyer professionals to work in areas
traditionally associated with law practice when the other professionals have expertise in those fields." [FN80]  *295
Accounting firms can currently sell insurance and securities in some states. [FN81]  With the addition of legal
services, accounting firms will offer consumers seamless one-stop shopping for professional services.  In holding
that brokers and title company officers could conduct real estate closings without lawyers, the New Jersey Supreme
Court stressed the role that the public interest plays in such decisions: "[L]ike all of our powers, this power over the
practice of law must be exercised in the public interest; more specifically, it is not a power given to us in order to
protect lawyers, but in order to protect the public . . . ." [FN82]
  Allowing lawyers to split fees with other professionals will not only help the big accounting firms; small law firms
will also benefit. [FN83]  For example, consider a sole practitioner that specializes in elder law.  The lawyer faces
competition from accountants, financial planners, banks, and a host of other businesses eager to better serve his
clients.  He would like to "form a consortium with a CPA and a money manager, and provide comprehensive
services on a fee basis that's split among the members of the consortium . . . ." [FN84]  Being able to do so would
help him better serve his clients by providing all the services under one roof.  Clients do not like the idea of being
sent out to different professionals to receive related services. [FN85]  Lawyers like him need to find new ways to
expand businesses and compete with accountants, financial planners, and health care managers.  An MDP also
would be financially rewarding to the lawyer because he could share in the fees generated from the sale of nonlegal
products like insurance policies and financial planning. [FN86]  Though local and national bar associations are
reluctant to believe it, getting rid of fee-splitting restraints would open up new opportunities for lawyers in firms of
various sizes. [FN87]
  Accounting firms have had little difficulty practicing law in *296 Europe. [FN88]  Most European countries either
allow accounting firms to engage in law practice themselves or to affiliate closely with law firms. [FN89]All of the
Big Five accounting firms have recently established, acquired, or otherwise associated with law firms outside of the
United States, giving the major accounting firms extensive law practices overseas. [FN90]  In some markets,
accounting firms are the largest providers of legal services for businesses. [FN91]  Allowing similar arrangements
makes sense in the United States as well.
  Those that support the use of MDPs further believe MDPs nurture client comfort and confidence with legal
representation. [FN92]  The Big Five accounting firms maintain that their worldwide offices enable them to satisfy
the needs of multi-national corporate and financial business consulting clients. [FN93]  For example, as a Big Five
firm's client becomes involved in transactions in countries where that firm has a presence, the client will be
comfortable that the firm's employees are familiar with the client's accountant who will be assisting with the
transactions. [FN94]
  MDP supporters also believe that the ethical concerns can be dealt with.  On conflicts of interest, some maintain
that for undisputed legal work, potential problems could be avoided if clients granted the MDP express permission
to act for a rival.  This type of consent is often obtained in the course of a consulting practice.  Accounting firms
generally employ "Chinese walls" in their practices, where teams serving one client are separated from teams
offering different services to the same client or from colleagues advising rivals. [FN95]
  *297 However, it is also widely accepted that, where legal work is concerned, the lawyers' tighter standards on
confidentiality should apply, and that lawyers should continue to be regulated by their professional bodies and
managed by fellow lawyers.
  With accounting firms successfully practicing law overseas, it is only a matter of time before accounting firms are
allowed to bring these practices to the United States.  Legal consultants to the major accounting firms are confident
that law practices will not be reserved for law firms in the future. [FN96]  "'Neither the bar associations nor the
courts are going to be able to stop this movement,' . . . 'The market will prevail."' [FN97]
  As accounting firms continue to recruit record numbers of lawyers and law students, many lawyers see the
accounting firms adding opportunities to a tight legal job market, while others see it as the beginning of the end of
the profession. [FN98]  The legal profession will be hard-pressed to develop a position that does not exhibit a sense
of elitism and self-preservation. [FN99]  In this consumer-driven era, professionalism and ethics arguments probably
will not carry lawyers very far. [FN100]
  Lawyers should be aware of other professionals interested in participating in MDPs beside the traditional
accounting firms.  For example, the American Express Bank has been aggressively acquiring accounting firms and
providing accounting services to its clients. [FN101]  Like accounting firms, banks and insurers, with the
deregulation of the financial services industries, are pervasive.
  While the ABA has not voted on the MDP issue yet, some local bar associations are moving forward.  In the spring
of 2000, the Philadelphia Bar Association became the first state or local bar association in the nation to ratify pro-
multidisciplinary practice legislation. [FN102]  The Philadelphia Bar Association's board of governors approved a
proposal that allows MDPs as long as the practice is at least fifty-one percent lawyer-owned. [FN103]  It is *298
necessary for the ABA to act quickly because other bar associations are sure to follow with their own resolutions.
  Ernst & Young, one of the Big Five accounting firms, recently financed the launch of a Washington, D.C., law firm
in an unusual development that underscores how the traditional walls are falling between U.S. law firms and
accounting firms. [FN104]  The new law firm is headed by two former partners from a prestigious Atlanta law firm.
While the new firm is not owned by Ernst & Young, the firm is backed by an Ernst & Young loan, is called McKee
Nelson Ernst & Young, and will move into Ernst & Young's Washington, D.C., offices. [FN105] If successful, the
arrangement could serve as a model for other major accounting and law firms eager to join forces when the fee-
splitting barriers come down. [FN106]  These examples demonstrate the need for action by the ABA.  If the ABA
waits too long, it may lose the ability to regulate lawyers that are involved in MDPs.
Conclusion
  The ABA's current prohibition against nonlawyer ownership of law firms attempts to protect the independence of
lawyers and the confidences of their clients.  The basis of those rules is that nonlawyer involvement in law firms
creates problems with conflicts of interest, confidentiality, and client solicitation, and threatens the autonomy of the
legal profession.  However, the prohibition appears to serve only the interests of lawyers and not the public at large.
  It is widely accepted that legal matters often contain nonlegal elements, and clients are increasingly seeking many
professional services from a single source.  As the work that lawyers confront has steadily grown in sophistication,
both lawyers' and clients' needs have changed.  Preserving a century-old restriction during a time of economic
globalization does not satisfy the current needs of lawyers or clients.  As the legal profession enters a new
millennium, it is crucial that rules of ethics that prohibit nonlawyer ownership of legal service providers yield to
provisions permitting and regulating MDPs so that U.S. firms may provide *299 clients with quality legal services in
an effective and efficient manner.
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